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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
[N]othing is needed more than truth, and in relation to it everything else has only
second-rate value.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act ("FCA" or "the
Act") allow private citizens to prosecute fraud on the government's
behalf.2 There are at least three primary justifications for such
provisions: (1) the need to provide private incentives to expose
fraudulent conduct, (2) the Justice Department's unwillingness to
aggressively prosecute fraud, and (3) the limited enforcement
resources available to the federal government. 3 The FCA contains a
jurisdictional bar that provides that no court shall have jurisdiction
over a qui tam FCA action if the information on which the action is
based has been publicly disclosed.4 Ostensibly, this jurisdictional bar
is in place to prohibit freeloaders from bringing parasitic actions while
contributing nothing to the actual disclosure of fraud.5 The central
problem this Note seeks to address is whether a disclosure pursuant
to the Freedom of Information Act constitutes a "public disclosure"
within the meaning of the FCA. Hence, this Note asks whether FCA
actions based on information in Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
disclosures will be jurisdictionally barred. The prevailing view is that
a disclosure made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act
qualifies as a "public disclosure" within the meaning of the FCA, thus
triggering the jurisdictional bar. This Note will demonstrate why the
prevailing interpretation is problematic, and why the future of qui
tam litigation under the FCA may be in jeopardy. While five courts of
appeals have considered this problem, to date no commentator has
addressed the issue.
An example of the minority view demonstrates how the FCA
and the Freedom of Information Act can synergize and lead to greater
prosecution of fraud and a greater net recovery for the United States
Treasury. In 1980, a contractor who sold soybean oil to the
government requested, through the Freedom of Information Act, cost
1. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 344 (Kaufmann ed., 1887).
2. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
3. See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in
Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1821-25 (1996).
4. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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and pricing data submitted by a competing contractor. 6 From the
pricing information disclosed through the Act, he was able to prove
that the competing contractor had defrauded the government by
selling soybean oil at inflated prices.7 In addition, the competing
contractor had submitted false data to the government in order to
support the inflated prices.8 The end result was that the fraud
exposure caused the competing contractor to be dropped from the
government program, although there is no evidence that the fraud was
ever formally prosecuted. 9 This case shows the usefulness of the FCA
in prosecuting fraud and recovering funds for the United States
Treasury. The future of the potential synergy of the FCA and the
FOIA, however, is unclear.
This Note will rely heavily on the history of the FCA in
proposing a solution. Part I provides a starting point for
understanding the complex issues involved by focusing on the early
history of the qui tam action. Part II traces the development of the
FCA from the Civil War era to its most recent amendment. Part III
explores the relevant structure of the FCA by outlining its commonly
invoked provisions. Part IV discusses the law and policy behind the so-
called public disclosure bar. Part V provides a brief introduction to the
Freedom of Information Act and sets out this Note's principle concern.
Part VI provides an analysis of the potential synergy of the FCA and
the Freedom of Information Act and proposes a solution to the central
problem based on interpretation of the relevant statutes.
II. HISTORY OF THE Qui TAM ACTION
Private citizens have enjoyed a long history of public law
enforcement and regulation both in the United States and in the rest
of the world.10 Precedent for legal provisions allowing the private
citizen to enforce public laws dates from ancient Roman and Anglo-
Saxon times.11 The phrase "qui tam" is short for "qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which is translated as
6. EvAN HENDRICKS, FORMER SECRETS: GOVERNMENT RECORDS MADE PUBLIC THROUGH
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 91 (1982) (discussing the many examples of fraud exposed
through the Freedom of Information Act).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
10. See James Fisher et al., Privatizing Regulation: Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in
the Financial Services Industries, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 117, 120 (2000).
11. See O.F. ROBINSON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ANCIENT ROME 100 (1995); J. Randy Beck,




"who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as his
own."'12 The modern qui tam plaintiff is often referred to as a
"relator."'13 Perhaps the most extensive and comprehensive history of
qui tam law enforcement comes from England. 14
An example of an early qui tam enforcement provision can be
found in Anglo-Saxon English law. Wihtred, the King of Kent, issued a
decree prohibiting labor on the Sabbath in A.D. 695.15 Wihtred's
decree contained a qui tam enforcement provision: "If a freeman works
during the forbidden time between sunset on Saturday evening and
sunset on Sunday evening, he shall forfeit his healsfang, and the man
who informs against him shall have half the fine, and the profits
arising from the labour."
16
Centuries after the widespread implementation of qui tam
legislation in England, Sir William Blackstone identified several
characteristics of a qui tam statute.' 7 Blackstone's Commentaries shed
valuable light on the history and purpose of qui tam litigation. Under
early English penal statutes, a claim could be brought by "any of the
king's subjects" who would pursue the action.' 8 Moreover, the person
bringing the action could sue even where he had suffered no injury by
the defendant's conduct.1 9 Blackstone called such actions "popular
actions" brought by "common informers," because they are given to the
12. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1
(2000) (citation omitted); see also Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y of Am. v. U.S. Plywood-
Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302, 305 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
13. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1993).
Alternatively, qui tam plaintiffs also may be referred to as "informers," see id., or sometimes as
"whistleblowers," see Fisher, supra note 10, at 120-21. Ancient Roman criminal law referred to
private citizen informants as "delatores." See Beck, supra note 11, at 566. The term "relator"
literally means "narrator." See Frederick M. Morgan, Jr. & Julie Webster Popham, The Last
Privateers Encounter Sloppy Seas: Inconsistent Original Source Jurisprudence Under the Federal
False ClaimsAct, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 163, 164 n.10 (1998).
14. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 11, at 565-66; Fisher, supra note 10, at 120; Patricia Meador
& Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves into a Modern Weapon,
65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 458-59 (1998). Note, however, that England's Parliament has since
eliminated qui tam legislation via the Common Informers Act of 1951. See Beck, supra note 11,
at 605.
15. Beck, supra note 11, at 567.
16. THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 3, 27 (F.L. Attenborough ed. & trans.,
1963).
17. Beck, supra note 11, at 552-53 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND *161-62). Blackstone primarily noted that qui tam actions exist when the
following criteria are present: (1) a statutory offense, (2) a penalty or forfeiture, (3) an
enforcement action pursued by a private party, (4) a lack of the necessity of a private injury, (5) a
private benefit extracted from the defendant, and (6) a binding effect on the government. Id.
18. Id. at 551 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161).
19. Id.
1552 [Vol. 55:1549
2002] THE MARRIAGE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 1553
public at large.20 Blackstone's Commentaries emphasize two important
purposes of qui tam litigation-the "common informer" simultaneously
advances the public interest and forecloses any subsequent
prosecution involving the same claim. 21
Though the qui tam action is unique in its structure and policy,
public participation in law enforcement is neither new nor limited to
qui tam actions. For example, in England, a proclamation by King
Henry I established that "each man is to be judged by his peers of the
same neighborhood," thereby bringing the judicial process to a local
level.22 Indeed, the advent of the jury itself may have stemmed from
an overriding goal of utilizing "local participation and social pressure"
in law enforcement. 23 Similarly, where the law has suffered from a
perceived weakness, or where it is nonexistent, individuals have taken
the law into their own hands via vigilante movements. 24 The
utilization of the qui tam action, therefore, was possibly precipitated
by a perceived need or desire to involve the citizenry in public law
enforcement.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. The Original FCA: Lincoln's Law
In 1863, Congress enacted the original False Claims Act (FCA)
at the request of President Abraham Lincoln.25 The primary purpose
20. Id.
21. Id. "Thus the qui tam informer stands in the shoes of a government attorney" who is
self-appointed and "statutorily empowered to enforce the social contract in place of public
officials." Id. Interestingly, Blackstone approaches the qui tam action from a contract perspective
rather than a legislative one. He argues that a fundamental social contract implies the obligation
to obey penal statutes and to pay the penalty incurred to any persons whom the law mandates.
Id. at 550.
22. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 120-21.
23. See id. at 120.
24. Id. From about 1840 to the 1900s, the American West was the site of many such
vigilante movements where "'the law' was what the dominant culture said it was, and the real
question seemed to be: '[W]hat is the dominant culture?'" Id. at 121.
25. See Gary W. Thompson, A Critical Analysis of Restrictive Interpretations Under the
False Claims Act's Public Disclosure Bar: Reopening the Qui Tam Door, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 669,
672-73 (1998). The original False Claims Act was commonly known as the "Lincoln Law." Id.
Note, however that the history of qui tam actions in America dates back to the early colonies
which employed qui tam statutes "in a wide variety of cases." Evan Caminker, The
Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 342 n.2 (1989). The First Congress also
employed qui tam statutory provisions in numerous forms for violations such as "harboring
runaway mariners" or "avoidance of liquor import duties." See id. at 342 n.3. Other qui tam
statutes enacted over one hundred years ago still remain on the books-for example, 25 U.S.C. §
81 (2000) (providing a private cause of action against one who unlawfully contracts with Indians)
and 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2000) (providing a private cause of action against one who falsely marks
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of the original FCA was to combat fraud against the Union Army
during the height of the Civil War.26 As the Civil War progressed,
President Lincoln realized that the Treasury was being depleted by
the war effort.27 Much ,of the Treasury's budget was being paid to
fraudulent claimants seeking payment for rancid beef,28 horses and
mules which had already been sold, and crates of sawdust supposedly
containing muskets.29 Perhaps most importantly, the FCA contained a
qui tam provision which allowed any person to file a suit on behalf of
the United States and which entitled both the government and the qui
tam relator to share in the recovery of money paid on fraudulent
claims. 30 Under the original FCA, violators were liable 'for double
damages and a $2,000 forfeiture with the relator collecting fifty
percent of the total governmental recovery-a hefty incentive to
expose fraud.31 Thus the original FCA provided a "tripartite
framework of values that underlie qui tam suits: (1) the use of citizens
to discover and expose fraud; (2) activation and advancement of cases
to prosecution; and (3) the addition of the relator's resources to the
fraud action. '3 2 The key provisions of the FCA have been amended
twice since its original enactment, and both amendments have had
dramatic substantive effects on prosecuting fraud against the
government. 3
3
B. The 1943 FCA Amendments
The FCA essentially lay dormant between the Civil War and
the New Deal, most likely due to the lack of significant government
patented articles). Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 769 n.1 (2000).
26. See, e.g., Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under
the Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23, 24 (1998); see
also United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976).
27 See Anthony L. DeWitt, Badges? We Don't Need No Stinking Badges! Citizen Attorney
Generals and the False Claims Act, 65 UMKC L. REV. 30, 31 (1996).
28. See id.
29. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 138.
30. See Thompson, supra note 25, at 673.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. The FCA is by no means the only vehicle that Congress has enacted to prevent fraud on
the government. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (stating that the "False Statements Act" prohibits
the making of false statements to the government by imposing criminal penalties); 18 U.S.C. §
287 (1994) (noting that the "Criminal False Claims Act" prohibits the making of false claims to
the government and carries a five-year jail sentence); 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (2000) (stating that the
"Truth in Negotiations Act" prohibits the submission of false statements in the form of
inaccurate cost or pricing data).
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spending.34 Federal spending dramatically increased, however, during
the New Deal and especially in preparation for World War II.35 In
1943 the Supreme Court decided an FCA action involving a relator
who apparently filed his complaint based solely. on the government's
previously filed criminal indictment.36 Based on the plain language of
the 1863 statute, the Supreme Court upheld the relator's action and
recovery despite the fact that the government objected.37 It seems
doubtful, however, that Congress ever intended the FCA to cover such
parasitic actions. The relator's action was based on publicly disclosed
government information, and the government argued that this
negated the principal objective of the FCA, which was to provide
incentives for persons to discover and bring forth allegations of fraud
against the government.
38
In the wake of United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, Attorney
General Francis Biddle officially delivered his complaint to Congress,
urging them to "put a stop to this unseemly and undignified scramble"
to file parasitic FCA actions based on government criminal
indictments. 39 The Attorney General sought to have Congress either
repeal the FCA altogether or amend it to providethe government with
the first chance to litigate the action. 40 After vigorous debate, the
House passed an amendment in 1943 containing a jurisdictional bar
which mandated that "[a] court shall have no jurisdiction to proceed
with any suit ... based upon evidence or information in the possession
of the United States."41 Additionally, the 1943 amendments
empowered the Department of Justice with the discretion to intervene
and take over an FCA action and reduced* the relator's share of
recovery to a maximum of twenty-five percent.42 By 1943 it had also
34. See Thompson, supra note 25, at 673.
35. See id.
36. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 545-48 (1943).
37. Id.
38. See Thompson, supra note 25, at 674. This interpretation also created a problem:
Potential relators would scramble to the courthouse searching for government indictments in
order to bring their own qui tam bounty action, when the government was obviously aware of
any fraud that such a person would uncover. Id. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that
the 1863 statute did not provide for government intervention in qui tam enforcement actions.
The relator could thus pursue the action unfettered by outside intervention. Id at 673 n.25.
39. See 89 CONG. REC. 7569, 7571'(1943).
40. Id.
41., See Thompson, supra note 25, at 676 (quoting 89 CONG. REC. 7569, 10,849.(1943)).
42. See Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 26, at 25-26 (citing Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, at §
3491(c)).
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become clear that the FCA was a disfavored action, and some courts
even went so far as to narrow the Act judicially.
43
C. The 1986 FCA Amendments
The modern FCA action lay virtually dormant throughout the
last half of the century primarily due to the strict 1943 amendments
and adverse court decisions regarding the FCA's vitality.44 Then, in
1986 Congress once again breathed life into the FCA with a series of
key amendments.45 In the mid-1980s, as the defense budget was rising
under President Reagan's broad defense strategy,46 the public was
outraged by several high-profile media expos6s which highlighted
excessive fraud (e.g., government payments of $600 for toilet seats,
$400 for hammers, and $7,622 for coffeemakers). 47
The impetus for reform became even more obvious in 1984
when a would-be qui tam plaintiffs FCA action was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, because the government possessed the information
revealing fraud, but only by virtue of the plaintiffs complaint. 48 Such
FCA jurisprudence effectively removed any incentive for private
citizens to bring FCA qui tam actions. With the jurisdictional bar
raised to such heights, private citizens were all but precluded from
43. See id. One court, for example, required the qui tam plaintiff to show "clear, unequivocal
and convincing" evidence as a heightened burden of proof. See United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d.
310, 315 (6th Cir. 1962). Another court required a "specific intent to defraud," arguably contrary
to the statutory guidelines. See United States v. Ekelman & Assocs., Inc., 532 F.2d 545, 548 (6th
Cir. 1976). The minority of the Senate Judiciary Committee opposed the 1943 amendments,
supporting abolition instead: "The qui tam mechanism of the FCA was enacted during Civil War
time, to meet a situation then existing, which does not now exist ... [n]ow adequate facilities in
respect to handling such matters exist and through the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
many other investigative agencies of the Government, adequate investigations of frauds against
the United States are being made." See Beck, supra note 11, at 559-60 n.82 (quoting S. REP. No.
78-291, pt. 1, at 2 (1943) (Supp. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 10756)).
44. See Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 343
n.12 (1989).
45. See id. at 243 n.13.
46. See generally Gaylord Shaw, Summit Ended with Tough Words; "No Way," Reagan Told
Soviet Leader, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1986, § 1, at 1 (discussing President Reagan's broad defense
strategy including "Star Wars").
47. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 381,
390 (2001); Beck, supra note 11, at 561. During Senate hearings, one Senator stated that "[o]ver
the past several years it seems like we have been treated to monthly scandals as we pick up the
newspaper with our morning coffee." Beck, supra note 11, at 642 (quoting S. REP. No. 99-345, at
13 (1986) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 13676), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5278).
48. See United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (7th Cir. 1984). The
jurisdictional bar was deemed to apply notwithstanding the fact that the only reason the
government was in possession of the information was because of the qui tam plaintiffs disclosure
to the government. See id.
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bringing FCA actions; therefore, the government could, at its
discretion, let fraud go either unnoticed or unprosecuted.49 In contrast,
the 1986 FCA amendments dictate that the jurisdictional bar should
only apply where the information has been publicly disclosed and
where the public disclosure did not originate from the relator in the
case. 50 Thus, the amendments seek a balance "between encouraging
private parties to expose fraud and preventing individuals from
enjoying large monetary rewards without contributing to the
disclosure of fraud.'
Through the enactment of the 1986 amendments, Congress
obviously sought to expand qui tam law enforcement and to encourage
more private citizens to bring FCA suits.5 2 The Department of Justice
estimates that "between [one] percent and [ten] percent of the entire
federal budget is lost to fraud every year. ' 53 Furthermore, while the
decade before the enactment of the 1986 amendments saw the filing of
only twenty qui tam FCA suits, relators filed nearly 1,100 suits in the
decade after the 1986 amendments.54 Private relators have recovered
a net $2.29 billion for the United States Treasury since the 1986
amendment. 55 Today, qui tam actions under the FCA include cases
involving health care fraud,56 defense fraud,57 and even environmental
fraud58 against the government.
59
49. See Thompson, supra note 25, at 678-79.
50. That is, if the relator is the source of the publicly disclosed information regarding the
fraud at issue, then the suit will be allowed; therefore, the court will not dismiss the case for lack
of jurisdiction as it would have under the previous statute. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(2000). The
Supreme Court noted that this amendment, by "expand[ing] the universe of plaintiffs,"
"essentially create[d] a new cause of action, not just an increased likelihood that an existing
cause of action will be pursued." See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520
U.S. 939, 950 (1997).
51. See Meador & Warren, supra note 14, at 460; see also supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
52. See Morgan & Popham, supra note 13, at 166-67; see also Michael Isikoff, Defense
Lobbyists Bottle up Bill on Contractor Fraud, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1986, at K01 (discussing the
widespread support for the bill by both Congress and the public while defense contracting
lobbyists staunchly opposed the bill).
53. Ann M. Lininger, The False Claims Act and Environmental Law Enforcement, 16 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 577, 579 (1997).
54. Id. (citing News Release, Dept. of Justice, Oct. 18, 1995, available at 1995 WL 614572).
55. See Beck, supra note 11, at 638. The relators recovered $409.8 million for themselves as
the statutory bounty. Another source computes that relators, on average, have recovered
eighteen percent of the total damages awarded. See Lininger, supra note 53, at 580. A total of $2
million was recovered in 1988 while relators recovered over $200 million for the United States
Treasury in 1995. Id. at 579. Note too, that these recoveries stem from lawsuits "against a
veritable who's-who of government contracting-large successful companies represented by the
nation's ablest law firms." See Morgan & Popham, supra note 13, at 167.
56. See, e.g., Michael Stockham, Note, "This Might Sting a Bit": Policing Skin Care in
Nursing Facilities by Litigating Fraud, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1041 (2000).
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D. Overriding Purpose of the FCA
The amended FCA has three primary goals: (1) to encourage
those with information of fraud on the government to disclose this
information; (2) to discourage 'parasitic qui tam actions that simply
take advantage of information already in the public domain;" and (3)
to assist and to prod the government to act upon the information
provided. 60  By enacting the FCA, Congress addressed the
government's weakness in exposing and prosecuting fraud on its
own.61 Fraud may go undetected "because of the government's 'weak
internal controls and the fact that government auditors do not pay
adequate attention to fraud.' "62 Not only does the government often
allow fraud to go undetected, but Congress determined that even
where the government knows of fraud, it takes action "in only a small
percentage of cases."63 Hence, the FCA was amended to cure such
government incentive problems by providing the public with an
57. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
58. See, e.g., Paul W. Morenberg, Comment, Environmental Fraud by Government
Contractors: A New Application of the False Claims Act, 22 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 623
(1995).
59. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 791
(2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('The False Claims Actlis also all-embracing in scope .. "). The
FCA "was intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in
financial loss to the government." United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968).
The FCA has also been used to effectively prosecute government construction fraud, research
grant fraud, customs fraud, student loan fraud, natural resource royalties fraud, agricultural
subsidy fraud, and municipal bond fraud (i.e., "yield-burning") in connection with certain tax-
exempt bond refinancings. Phillips & Cohen, Other Types of Fraud, available at
http://www.whistleblowers.com/HTMLBODY/cmtypso.htm. But see Vermont Agency of Natural
Res., 529 U.S. at 770 (holding that the FCA is not applicable to states, because states are not
"persons" for purposes of the FCA); see also United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch.
Bd., 244 F.3d 486, 493 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that local governments are not subject to FCA
liability and are not "persons" under the Act, based on the legislative history regarding punitive
damages under § 3729; local governments are not subject to punitive damages as a matter of
public policy).
60. United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 400 (3d
Cir. 1999) (Becker, C.J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1-8, 23-24 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266-73, 5288-89).
61. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 25, at 677.
62. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-660, at 18 (1986)); accord S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2-3,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267-68.
63. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5267).
"[Dietecting fraud is usually very difficult without the cooperation of individuals who are either
close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity. Yet in the area of government
fraud, there appears to be a great unwillingness to expose illegalities." See Beck, supra note 11,
at 563 n.109. (quoting S. REP. No. 99-345, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5269).
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incentive to expose fraud.64 The alleged prosecutorial diffidence of the
Justice Department with respect to fraud was perceived to originate
from two basic problems. 65 First, some pointed to the Gramm-Rudman
budget crunch, which severely limited the resources of government
enforcement mechanisms. 66 Second, and more sinister, some claimed
that the Justice Department failed to prosecute fraud because: of
prevailing "political considerations. 67
Hence, at least one difficulty Congress sought to cure was the
lack of adequate governmental resources available to pursue
allegations of fraud.68 By arming private citizens with not only the
right to expose fraud but also a direct prosecutorial role in the
litigation, Congress supplemented limited monetary and human
governmental resources with private resources. 69 Of course, it is also
probable that an implicit goal of the FCA was not only to recover
stolen funds for the Treasury, but also to deter fraud on the
government by making it prohibitively expensive.70
IV. STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN FCA
The False Claims Act imposes civil liability on any person who
knowingly presents a false or fraudulent claim to the government.7 1
There are various contexts in which false claims satisfying the FCA
may be presented. Specifically, the FCA imposes liability on any
person who:
64. The Senate concluded that "most fraud referrals remain unprosecuted, and lost public
funds, therefore, remain uncollected." See Thompson, supra note 25, at 678 (quoting S. REP. No.
99-345, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269). "According to the Senate report, Justice
Department statistics showed that in fiscal year 1985 the civil division received 2,734 fraud
referrals but filed only [thirty-six] complaints....." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 99-345, at 4 n.10,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269 n.10). Compare the lack of incentive the government
currently has to prosecute fraud with the adverse incentive local government had to prosecute
fraud prior to the 1328 Statute of Northampton, which empowered citizens to bring forth
allegations of illegal conduct for a statutory reward. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying
text.
65. See Beck, supra note 11, at 564.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Thompson, supra note 25, at 678-79. In effect, Congress has appointed private
attorneys general to prosecute fraud on the government's, behalf via a partial assignment of the
government's damages claim. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000). A partial assignment is necessary, in part, to justify constitutional
standing under Article III. Thompson, supra note 25, at 678-79.
69. See Thompson, supra note 25, at 678-79. An FCA case can be extremely expensive to
litigate. See generally DeWitt, supra note 27, at 31 (discussing the high costs of nonintervention
by the U.S. Department of Justice).
70. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
71. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2000).
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1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the
United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the
Government;
3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim
allowed or paid;
4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by
the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully to
conceal the property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the
amount for which the person receives a certificate or receipt;
5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used,
or to be used by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government,
makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the
information on the receipt is true;
6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public
property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the
Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the property; or
7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government.
7 2
Hence, to prevail in an FCA action, a relator must generally
prove at least three elements: (1) that the defendant presented a claim
for payment or approval, (2) that the claim presented was false or
fraudulent, and (3) that the defendant acted knowingly.73 The
following summary will highlight a broad remedial reading of the
statute's provisions similar to that advocated in Parts VI and VII.
A. The FCA's Scienter Provision
The amended FCA contains a liberal scienter provision. A
person "knowingly" engages in fraudulent conduct under the FCA if
that person: "(1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in
deliberate ignorance of the truth or the falsity of the information; )r
(3) acts in reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the information,
72. § 3729(a)(2). Sections (a)(3) through (a)(6) are less common and are not directly
discussed here.
73. Lininger, supra note 53, at 580. The FCA, however, is not a tool for relators alone.
Wholly apart from its qui tam provisions, the FCA is a tool for prosecuting fraud on the
government without private intervention. See § 3729. This Note deals only with the FCA's qui
tam provisions authorizing private intervention.
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and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required."74 The expansive
scope of this provision is striking. For example, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit found a doctor liable for
"knowingly" presenting a false claim under the "reckless disregard"
standard for failing to review submitted bills calculated by his wife.
75
The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that mere negligence or an
honest mistake is not sufficient to satisfy the broad scienter
provision.
7 6
B. The Meaning of "Claim"
The defendant must present, or cause to be presented, a claim
for payment or approval. 77 The statute vaguely, but broadly, defines a
claim as
includ[ing] any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or
property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States
Government provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or
demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other
recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded."
7 8
The issue of what qualifies as a "claim" has significance not only
because there is no liability without it but also because damages may
depend on the number of false claims presented.7 9
The Supreme Court considered the question of the potential
scope of the word "claim" in 1968.80 Its decision, though construing a
previous version of the FCA, provides valuable guidance not only on
the meaning of the term in the expanded FCA, but also upon the
guiding principle of FCA interpretation.81 The issue before the Court
was whether the FCA was applicable to a situation in which false
information had been supplied to a federal agency, the Commodity
Credit Corporation ("CCC").82 The Court also considered whether the
defendant grain dealer had submitted a "claim" to the CCC when it
submitted a loan application containing fraudulent statements to the
74. § 3729(b). This specific provision sought to clarify what some courts had apparently
misinterpreted prior to the 1986 amendments-that no specific intent is required. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ekelman & Assocs., Inc., 532 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that a
specific intent to defraud is required under the FCA).
75. United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
76. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996).
77. § 3729(a).
78. § 3729(c)
79. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
80. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968).
81. See id.
82. See id. at 229.
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agency.8 3 Citing the original purpose and broad phrasing of the Act,8 4
the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision.8 5 The Court held that
"the term 'claims,' as used in the statute, is broad enough to reach the
conduct alleged by the Government in its complaint" and that the
CCC, as a wholly owned government subsidiary, qualified as "the
Government of the United States" within the meaning of the statute.8 6
This decision is important because it demonstrates the Supreme
Court's willingness to read the FCA liberally-that is, as a remedial
statute with broad ramifications.8 7
The FCA sets forth several categories of false claims. First,
under § 3729(a)(1), a defendant presents a claim when that person
fraudulently seeks a government benefit without revealing that he is
not entitled or eligible for such a benefit.88 For example, the court in
United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp. indicated that a
defendant presents a "claim" within the meaning of § 3729(a)(1) when
he knowingly fails to abide by relevant environmental compliance
provisions of a government contract and then attempts to collect
payment under the contract as if all the terms of the contract had
been satisfied.8 9 The court in United States v. Nazon indicated that a
doctor who presented files for Medicaid reimbursement presented a
"claim" under § 3729(a)(1) when he was not legally eligible for such
reimbursement. 90 In United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft
Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment after finding a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the defendant contractor had submitted a "claim"
when he sought payment for work to which he may not have been
entitled.91 As these decisions suggest, defendants will not only find
83. See id. The defendant in this case was not seeking payment from the government on a
"claim," but was only seeking a government-sponsored loan. Id. Nonetheless, the Court construed
this conduct as falling within the broad phrasing of the FCA, even though the defendant's
conduct did not strictly come within the purview of the Act. See id.
84. Note that the Court interpreted a more restrictive FCA than the current expanded FCA.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
85. Id. at 233.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. See Lininger, supra note 53, at 582-83.
89. 97 F.3d 937, 938 (7th Cir. 1996); Lininger, supra note 53, at 582-83.
90. No. 93-C-5456, 1993 WL 459966, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see also Lininger, supra note 53,
at 584.
91. 63 F.3d 1512, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1995). In Hughes Aircraft Co., defendant contractor
sought payment for services rendered even though defendant's accounting records indicated that
its costs may not have been properly allocated. Id. Hence, defendant may not have been entitled
to the full benefit it sought. Id. at 1516. The Supreme Court later dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997).
1562 [Vol. 55:1549
2002] THE MARRIAGE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
themselves liable under § 3729(a)(1) for affirmatively presenting a
fraudulent claim, but also will be liable for a failure to disclose their
ineligibility for a benefit sought.92 Such reasoning underscores the
broad scope commonly given to the FCA in light of its congressional
purpose.
Second, under § 3729(a)(2), a defendant presents a "claim"
when "he or she knowingly makes, uses, or causes someone else to
make or use, a false record or statement to enable the defendant to
improperly obtain a benefit from the United States. ''93 The distinction
between this provision and § 3729(a)(1) is that in § 3729(a)(2), one
must show that the defendant affirmatively made a false statement
through a record.94 That is, the defendant is subject to liability under §
3729(a)(2) if and only if he or she utilizes a false record indicating
eligibility for a benefit that he or she is in fact not eligible to receive. 95
For example, in Pickens v. Kanawha River Towing, the court held that
a barge operator acting as a government contractor was not liable
under § 3729(a)(2) for submitting invoices containing false statements
regarding compliance with the Clean Water Act. 96 The government's
precondition for payment was compliance with environmental laws,
and the defendant's invoice seeking payment therefore may have
qualified as a "claim" under § 3729(a)(2) because the invoice was a
false record.97 In other words, the invoice represented that the
defendant was eligible to receive payment when, in fact, he had not
complied with all the terms of the contract.98 Because the invoice was
never directly presented to the government, but instead to another
contractor, the defendant was not found liable.99 Nonetheless, the
defendant was held liable under § 3729(a)(2) on the theory that he
failed to record required discharges in the ship's logbook, which
constituted the submission of a false record under § 3729(a)(2). 10 0
A "claim" under § 3729(a)(2) therefore requires an affirmatively
false statement representing eligibility for a benefit that one is not
legally eligible to receive. 10 1 Moreover, the Pickens decision again
underscores the broad scope of the FCA and the willingness of at least
92. See Lininger, supra note 53, at 584.
93. Id. at 585.
94. See id.; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2000).
95. See § 3729(a)(2); see also Lininger, supra note 53, at 585.
96. 916 F. Supp. 702, 707 (S.D. Ohio 1996); see also Lininger, supra note 53, at 585-86.
97. See Kanawha Rover Towing, 916 F. Supp. at 707.
98. Id.






some courts to apply the statute in borderline cases.10 2 It seems far
from clear that a failure to record required information qualifies as
affirmative conduct; nevertheless, the Pickens court was prepared to
give the statute a broad remedial interpretation to realize its central
purpose of prosecuting and deterring fraud. 103
Under § 3729(a)(7), a defendant also presents a "claim" when
he or she utilizes a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or
decrease an otherwise outstanding obligation to pay the
government. 10 4 This provision has come to be known as the "reverse
false claims" provision.10 5 Here, the "cause of action arises not from
the submission of a claim to be paid, but from the concealment of an
obligation owed to the government." 10 6 Like § 3729(a)(2), this provision
requires the affirmative action of making a false record, but here the
record is falsified to decrease an already existing obligation.
10 7
Importantly, no request for payment is required under this
provision.108 The Pickens court held the defendants liable under §
3729(a)(7) as well as under § 3729(a)(2) because the ship's log was
falsified in order to avoid an obligation to the government. 10 9 Because
the government relied on the ship's log to conduct a regulatory
function, the contractor's failure to record the illegal dumping of waste
in violation of the Clean Water Act constituted a false "claim."110 The
court found that the ship's log constituted a "record" such that "if the
log excludes a major event that it should ordinarily contain, the record
is a false one."11 Once again, although the statutory language of §
3729(a)(7) seems to require an affirmative false statement or record,
the Pickens court interpreted the Act liberally, characterizing an
affirmative omission as an affirmative action.
11 2
102. See United States ex rel. Pickens v. Kanawha River Towing, 916 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ohio
1996).
103. See id.
104. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2000).
105. See, e.g., Dewitt, supra note 27, at 37; Lininger, supra note 53, at 586-87. At least one
commentator has noted that this provision of the FCA has been widely underused. See Dewitt,
supra note 27, at 37.
106. Dewitt, supra note 27, at 37.
107. See § 3729(a)(7).
108. Id.
109. Kanawha River Towing, 916 F. Supp. at 707.
110. Id. at 707.
111. Id. at 708. "If the government relies upon or otherwise reviews such [ships'] logs as part
of its regulatory role, then the defendants would have submitted a false report in order to avoid
an obligation to the government." Id.
112. Id.
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C. Requirement of Falsity
Finally, a defendant's claim under § 3729 must be false or
fraudulent.11 3 In the absence of specific statutory guidance, courts
have interpreted "false or fraudulent" in an objective fashion.
1 4
Courts have held that a claim is false only "if it is false under any
reasonable interpretation."' 15 For example, the Ninth Circuit has held
that when a legal dispute exists regarding the truth or falsity of the
claim submitted, the claim is at least not prima facie false. 116 In
another case, United States v. Krizek, a doctor's claim was not
considered false because of the reasonableness of the doctor's belief in
its truth.11 7 The fact that the doctor commonly billed for more time
than he actually spent with the patient was inconsequential, because
the practice is common in the psychotherapist community.118 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently examined the meaning of the
falsity requirement. 1 9 The court noted that "[t]he juxtaposition of the
word 'false' with the word 'fraudulent,' plus the meanings of the words
comprising the phrase 'false claim,' suggest an improper claim is
aimed at extracting money the government otherwise would not have
paid."1 20 Finding the FCA to focus primarily on restitution, the court
saw an essential link between the false claim and the government's
decision to pay the claim. 21 The court also noted a dichotomy between
two categories of potential false claims: (1) legally false claims, and (2)
113. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000). The determination of whether a claim is false or fraudulent
has important implications for expanding the reach of FCA litigation-particularly for "anti-
kickback" violations. See Meador & Warren, supra note 14, at 458-59, 473 (discussing, for
example, the Medicare antikickback statute which prohibits kickbacks as remuneration such
that the FCA might apply but only if "a claim induced by a kickback is rendered false").
114. See Meador & Warren, supra note 14, at 464.
115. Id. at 465.
116. See Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1477 (9th Cir. 1996). "[Ihe
term "false or fraudulent" is not defined in the Act." United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274
F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 2001).
117. See 859 F. Supp. 5, 10 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding that the claims submitted, although not
technically correct procedure, did not constitute false claims within the meaning of the FCA
where the doctor was charged for a systematic practice of overbilling commonly known as
"upcoding").
118. Id. The additional billed time included "bundled services" such as a "review of patient
file" and "prescription management." Id. at 10. The government contended that while the code
billed by the doctor required "face-to-face" contact with the patient for forty-five to fifty minutes,
the doctor had actually not spent that entire time "face-to-face" with the patient but instead had
used part of the time for other services. Id. at 9.
119. See United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001).




factually false claims. 122 A legally false claim, under the "certification
theory [is] predicated upon a false representation of compliance with a
federal statute or regulation or a prescribed contractual term.'1 23 A
factually false claim, or "factually false certification," involves "an
incorrect description of goods or services provided or a request for
reimbursement for goods or services never provided."124 Importantly,
the FCA embraces both "legally false" and "factually false" claims, but
only to the extent that the falsity of the claim actually "influenced the
government's decision to pay." 125 Thus, the meaning of a "false claim"
is intrinsically bound up with an uncertain variable-whether the
government's payment decision would have been different but for the
false claim.
126
D. The FCA's Damages Provision
In its attempt to discourage fraud and replenish the United
States Treasury, the FCA provides for severe penalties. 27 First, the
plain language of § 3729 does not require that the plaintiff show
financial injury to the United States, nor does it require that the
United States actually suffer any financial injury. 28 The damages
provision provides that the government is entitled to a "civil penalty of
not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000" for each false claim
submitted. 29 For example, in United States v. Lorenzo, a doctor who
submitted 3,683 false claims to Medicare was found liable for over $18
122. Id. The court further divides the universe of possible claims into an expressly false
certification theory and an impliedly false certification theory. See id.
123. Id. at 696-97; see also Lisa Michelle Phelps, Note, Calling off the Bounty Hunters:
Discrediting the Use of Alleged Anti-Kickback Violations to Support Civil False Claims Actions,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1014-15 (1998).
124. Straus, 274 F.3d at 697.
125. See id. But see 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000) (providing for civil penalties regardless of
whether the government was injured or whether the government would have paid the claim but
for the fraud).
126. Straus, 274 F.3d at 697.
127. "Any person who.., is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not
less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus [three] times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of that person .. " § 3729(a).
128. See id.
129. Id. While it appears from the legislative history that Congress intended damages to
apply irrespective of actual injury, some courts have nonetheless suggested that actual damages
are necessary for liability under the Act. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273. See, e.g., Straus, 274 F.3d at 687 (suggesting that the FCA damages
provision is limited to instances in which the false claim would have actually "influenced the
government's decision to pay"); see also Young-Montenay, Inc. v. United States, 15 F.3d 1040,
1043 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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million dollars in civil penalties. 130 The court noted that the provision
granted no discretion in setting the penalty and that it must be
between $5,000 and $10,000 for each claim submitted. 31 Perhaps
most importantly, the FCA provides, for treble damages. 32 This
provision can be potent against large-scale, nonreccurring fraud, such
as procurement fraud where the government sustains large losses.
The burden of proving damages under the FCA rests with the relator
and requires a preponderance of the evidence.
133
E. Procedural Aspects of an FCA Claim
Complying with all the procedural aspects of the FCA statute is
of paramount importance. 34 First, the Act prohibits relators from
bringing actions where the government is already party to an action
based on the same allegations or transactions. 35 The purpose of this
jurisdictional bar is to prevent parasitic qui tam actions by relators
who add nothing to the government's pending case. 136 The Act includes
another jurisdictional bar, often called the "first-to-file" bar, which
precludes any FCA action that is based on the same allegations as a
previously filed action.
137
As a practical matter, theFCA requires a qui tam complaint to
be filed in camera and placed under seal for a sixty-day waiting
130. See United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1991). The Supreme Court,
however, has held that the imposition of the FCA civil penalty after the defendant has sustained
a criminal penalty for the same action constitutes double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment.
See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451-52 (1989). However, the Double Jeopardy Clause
is not applicable to litigation between private parties. Id. at 451. The open question, then, is
whether a qui tam action under the FCA implicates the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Browing-
Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,, 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989). Furthermore, at least
one district court has invoked the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause to limit FCA
damage awards. See United States ex rel. Smith v. Gilbert Realty Co., 840 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.
Mich. 1993).
131. In that case, the court decided to pierce the corporate veil, and the individual doctor and
his business were therefore held jointly and severally liable for the entire $18,415,000. Lorenzo,
768 F. Supp. at 1133. The court noted that the defendant had failed to observe corporate
formalities and was undercapitalized. Id.
132. § 3729(a). The Supreme Court has noted that the treble damages provision is essentially
punitive in nature: "The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to
deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers." Vermont Agency of
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 786 (2000) (quoting Texas Indus.,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981)).
133. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (2000).
134. See § 3730.
135. See § 3730(e)(3). This is sometimes referred to as the "government was first" bar. See,
e.g., Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 26, at 36.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 35.
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period.138 The complaint may not be served on the defendant until the
court so orders. 139 The purpose of the sixty-day period is to give the
government ample time to decide whether or not it will intervene in
the action while allegations remain out of the public domain. 140 Under
§ 3730, the government is given the choice either to intervene in the
FCA action, in which case it will lead the prosecution, or to decline to
intervene, in which case the action may go forward under the direction
of the relator. 141
V. THE FCA's PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BAR
In addition to the two jurisdictional bars mentioned above, the
FCA includes a third jurisdictional bar: the "public disclosure bar."
The public disclosure bar and its surrounding body of precedent are
complex, confusing, and the subject of conflicting interpretations. 42
Specifically, the public disclosure bar found in § 3730(e)(4) provides:
(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the
public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative
hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by
the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individual who has direct
and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and
has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action
under this section which is based on the information. 143
Thus, the FCA bars any action "based upon" a "public
disclosure" of "allegations or transactions" unless the relator qualifies
as the "original source" of such "allegations or transactions."'144 That
the public disclosure bar originated with the 1986 amendments is
instructive of its purpose. One court of appeals explained that the bar
was intended to provide "incentives to whistleblowing insiders with
138. § 3730(b)(2).
139. Id.
140. See Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 26, at 36-37. This provision may inadvertently
create problems for additional would-be relators who file in the gap period before the sanctity of
the seal is broken, because their action will be barred under the "first-to-file" bar. See id.; §
3730(b)(5). The government may also dismiss the action upon a hearing and with the approval of
the court. § 3730(c)(2).
141. See § 3730(c)(3)-(4).
142. See, e.g., Robert L. Vogel, The Public Disclosure Bar Against Qui Tam Suits, 24 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 477 (1995); see generally, Thompson, supra note 25, at 672 (exploring the ways in
which "courts have used the public disclosure bar").
143. § 3730(e)(4).
144. See id.
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genuinely valuable information" while barring "parasitic
exploitation[s] of the public coffers, . . . [by] ... opportunistic plaintiffs
who have no significant information to contribute of their own."
145
Though an exhaustive analysis of the public disclosure bar is beyond
the scope of this Note, mention of a few representative cases will
facilitate a more fruitful analysis of the "public disclosure" bar as it
relates to the Freedom of Information Act.
146
A. The Meaning of "Based Upon"
The public disclosure bar is only activated if a qui tam action is
"based upon" a public disclosure. 147 Currently, the circuits are split as
to the meaning of the phrase "based upon."'148 The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit has developed a common sense interpretation of
"based upon" which seems to best conform to the language and
purpose of the FCA.' 49 In United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., the court was confronted by an FCA action in which
the allegations in the relator's complaint were publicly disclosed but in
which the individual relator had independent knowledge of the
allegations in the complaint. 50 Initially, the court relied upon the
plain language of the statute (and a dictionary) in deciding that "based
upon" means "to use as a basis for."' 5' While vacating the district
court's ruling, the court held that the public disclosure bar was not
triggered in this instance, because the relator's action was not
"actually derived from" a public disclosure. 52
The Fourth Circuit decision, although currently representing
only a minority view, best comports with both the plain language and
policy of the FCA, because it encourages FCA actions based on
personal knowledge (which otherwise may not be pursued) while
discouraging parasitic FCA suits derived solely from information in
145. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
146. For more on the public disclosure bar, see generally Thompson, supra note 25; Vogel,
supra note 142; and Lininger, supra note 53.
147. See § 3730(e)(4).
148. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1348 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that "based upon" means "derived from," such that the bar is only triggered
as to the realtor if his complaint was "derived from" the public disclosure). But see United States
ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trustees, 161 F.3d 533, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that "based upon"
means "supported by" or "same as," such that the bar is triggered irrespective of whether the
individual relator learned about the allegations via the public disclosure).
149. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d at 1348.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 1349.
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the pubic domain. 153 Note, however, that "[a]ll the other circuits that
have reached this question have disagreed with the Fourth
Circuit... ,,154 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has had an occasion
to interpret the phrase "based upon," albeit in a non-FCA context. 155
In interpreting a federal jurisdiction statute where "based upon" was a
key component of the decisional calculus, the Court held that a claim
was "based upon" conduct only if that conduct formed the "basis" or
"foundation" of the claim.
156
B. The Meaning of 'Allegations or Transactions"
A relator's complaint must be based upon publicly disclosed
"allegations or transactions" in order for the public disclosure bar to be
triggered. 15 7 It is crucial to develop a tenable theory of what
constitutes "allegations or transactions" in order to realize the purpose
of the FCA. In some close cases, the court must compare the relator's
complaint to the publicly disclosed information to determine "whether
there is a sufficient similarity to trigger the statutory bar."158 Courts
are not, however, barred from hearing every action brought by a
relator involving publicly available information; instead, the bar is
activated only "if the publicly disclosed information is so substantial
as to constitute 'allegations or transactions.' "159
In United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Railway v. Quinn,
the D.C. Circuit explained that a mere disclosure of relevant facts
153. This view strikes a balance most in line with the spirit of the 1986 amendments-
between allowing legitimate FCA actions and disallowing actions where the relator contributes
nothing to the suit. As one commentator notes, the FCA has dual goals: "(1) to encourage private
citizens with first-hand knowledge to expose fraud; and (2) to avoid civil actions by opportunists
attempting to capitalize on public information without seriously contributing to the disclosure of
fraud." See Lininger, supra note 53, at 590-91. The Fourth Circuit decision appears to further
both aims. See id. Note, however, that the Fourth Circuit's logic has been the subject of almost
universal disapproval. See id.
154. United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 386 (3d
Cir. 1999). Most circuits have held that "based upon" means "supported by" or "substantially
similar to." See United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trustees, 161 F.3d 533, 539-40 (9th Cir.
1998); United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 682-84 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc. 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir.
1992); United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir. 1992).
155. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (stating that respondent based his suit on
allegedly tortious conduct, not on a breach of contract).
156. Id.
157. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2000).
158. QuI TAM LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 47 (Howard W. Cox & Peter B.
Hutt, II eds., 1999).
159. Lininger, supra note 53, at 591 (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry.
v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
2002] THE MARRIAGE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
supporting a claim does not rise to the level of "allegations or
transactions."'160 The language of the Quinn court is often quoted:
[I]f X + Y = Z, Z represents the allegation of fraud and X and Y represent its essential
elements. In order to disclose the fraudulent transaction publicly, the combination of X
and Y must be revealed, from which readers or listeners may infer Z, i.e., the conclusion
that fraud has been committed. The language employed in § 3730(e)(4)(A) suggests that
Congress sought to prohibit qui tam actions only when either the allegation of fraud or
the critical elements of the fraudulent transaction themselves were in the public
domain .... 161
In contrast, at least one commentator has noted that although the
statute speaks strictly of "publicly disclosed information," it is
commonly understood by courts that "both the allegation of fraud and
all information proving the allegation" must be publicly disclosed to
trigger the bar.162 Similarly, in Wang v. FMC Corp., the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the FCA bars suits based
on publicly disclosed "allegations or transactions," not mere public
information. 163
C. The Meaning of "Original Source"
The FCA contains one exception to the public disclosure bar: If
the relator is an original source of the public disclosure, the suit will
not be barred. 164 According to the legislative history of the 1986
amendments, "[t]he paradigmatic 'original source' is a whistleblowing
insider.' 1 65 Correspondingly, courts have strictly required that a
relator's knowledge be "direct and independent" in order for that
relator to qualify as an original source. 166 "Direct knowledge" under
the Act has been defined as knowledge "marked by absence of an
intervening agency," or as knowledge "unmediated by anything but
[the relator's] own labor," while " '[i]ndependent knowledge' has been
consistently defined as knowledge that is not dependant on public
disclosure.1 67  In addition to the "direct and independent"
160. 14 F.3d 645, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
161. Id. at 654.
162. Lininger, supra note 53, at 592 (emphasis added).
163. See Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992); Lininger, supra note 53, at
592. Note the logical distinction between a bare assertion and the proof of that assertion. See id.
164. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
165. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269.
166. QuI TAM LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, supra note 158, at 49.




requirement, the would-be "original source" relator must voluntarily
provide the government with information prior to filing a complaint. 168
The Second and Ninth Circuits have imposed a third
requirement-that the relator must "play some part" in making the
"original public disclosure." 169 In contrast, the Third, Fourth, Seventh,
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have rejected this requirement. 170
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected this requirement
as an "additional extratextual requirement that was not intended by
Congress.' 1
71
While the decisions discussed above certainly do not represent
an exhaustive study of the many facets of the complex public
disclosure bar, they provide a context for modern FCA interpretation.
It seems as if virtually no aspect of the FCA is the subject of universal
agreement. While some courts opt to invoke the usual canons of
statutory construction, others turn to the FCA's vast legislative
history. Interpretation of the FCA is doubtless hampered by several
textual gaps. A court's interpretational problem is further
compounded by its attempt to find a delicate balance between
encouraging FCA suits that are beneficial to the Treasury while
disallowing parasitic and opportunistic actions. It will be helpful to
keep this central balance in mind throughout the course of the
following discussion of the Freedom of Information Act.
VI. INTERACTION OF THE FCA AND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
A. A Brief FOIA Primer
The United States government is the world's largest producer
of information. 172 The American citizen's right to this vast body of
information derives from England, where the press was officially
prohibited from reporting on the actions of the House of Commons and
the House of Lords. 73 The idea of an "informed citizenry took on new
meaning" when the Continental Congress declared independence in
168. See United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 865-66 (7th
Cir. 1999).
169. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418; see also United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 5 F.3d
407, 411 (9th Cir. 1993).
170. QuI TAM LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, supra note 158, at 53.
171. United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1351 (4th Cir.
1994).
172. FEDERAL INFORMATION POLICIES IN THE 1990S 1 (Peter Hernon et al. eds., 1996).
173. HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: ORIGINS
AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 1 (1999).
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1776.174 Justice Louis Brandeis later emphasized the importance of
public information to all citizens in Whitney v. California, writing
"that public discussion is a political duty; and that it should be a
fundamental principle of the American government."'175 Finally, after
years of discussion and debate concerning the public's right-to-know,
the Freedom of Information Act was signed into law on Independence
Day, 1966.176
The FOIA is a disclosure statute that grants every individual
an equal statutory right to access government information.177 Citizens
also have a statutory right to seek judicial review of denials of
requested government information. 178 The FOIA, as amended in 1974,
1976, 1986, and 1996, contains six subsections. 79 Information sought
from a governmental agency by any citizen, pursuant to a proper
request, is subject to disclosure unless one of nine exemptions
applies. 80 The exemptions are structured such that an agency may
withhold information falling into the Act's various exempted
categories.' 8' Not only must a request under the FOIA satisfy the
requisite statutory hurdles of the nine exemptions, but it may also be
the subject of hostile opposition from the agency receiving the request
as well as from the executive branch.18 2 It is important to note that the
FOIA is not just a tool for curious citizens, as many corporations have
174. RICHARD D. BROWN, THE STRENGTH OF A PEOPLE: THE IDEA OF AN INFORMED CITIZENRY
IN AMERICA, 1650-1870 xiv (1996).
175. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
176. FOERSTEL, supra note 173, at 42.
177. Id. at 44.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 44-57.
180. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994).
181. Id. Matters exempt from disclosure are as follows: (1) matters specifically authorized by
Executive Order "to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are
properly classified pursuant to such an order," (2) "[mlatters related solely to the internal
personnel rules and practices of an agency," (3) "[mlatters specifically exempted from disclosure
by statute, providing that such statute leaves no discretion on the issue or establishes particular
criteria or types of material for withholding," (4) "[trade secrets and commercial or financial
information that is privileged or confidential," (5) "[i]nter-agency or intra-agency
communications which would not be available by law in litigation with the agency," (6)
"[p]ersonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," (7) "[rlecords or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes ... " (8) "[miatters related to reports prepared by ... an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions," (9) "[gleological and
geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells." FOERSTEL, supra note 173,
at 61-64.
182. See FOERSTEL, supra note 173, at 71, 76.
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found the FOIA indispensable in obtaining important business
information about themselves and their competitors.
183
B. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co.
The Ninth Circuit case of United States ex rel. Schumer v.
Hughes Aircraft Co. aptly illustrates this Note's central focus. 8 4 The
appellant relator, William Schumer, brought a qui tam FCA action
against Hughes Aircraft Company ("Hughes"), alleging that Hughes
defrauded the government in a defense procurement contract.
8 5
Specifically, Schumer, a former employee of Hughes, alleged that
Hughes had improperly allocated development expenditures between
two separate projects: a B-2 radar project for the Northrop
Corporation and an F-15 project for the United States Air Force.
86
Because each project required the development of similar technology,
Hughes entered into internal "commonality. agreements" by which the
cost of common components would be allocated to either project,
presumably with the consent of both parties.'87 Later, Schumer
alleged that the "commonality agreements" were not authorized and
were deliberately concealed from both parties.
88
After extensive government audits, the government concluded
that the agreements had not been authorized and were not correctly
accounted for in corporate disclosure statements. 8 9 The government
therefore withheld payment owed Hughes in the amount of $15.4
million. 190 Upon Schumer's complaint, and after a sixteen-month
independent investigation, however, the Department of Justice
declined to intervene in the case. 19' At trial, the district court granted
183. See id. at 137. Approximately seventy-five percent of all FOIA requests are from
businesses and lawyers working for businesses. Id. Note, however, that since 1987, pursuant to
President Reagan's Executive Order, companies must be notified in advance of FOIA disclosures.
Interestingly, many "reverse-FOIA" lawsuits have emerged; here, companies are attempting to
prevent the disclosure of government-held information in response to FOIA requests. Id.
184. 63 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939 (1997).






191. See id. at 1516. One commentator observed that a decision of nonintervention by the
Department of Justice is the "kiss of'death" for a FCA action. See Dewitt, supra note 27, at 46
n.118. Since FCA cases can be prohibitively expensive, every effort should be made to persuade
the Department of Justice to prosecute the case. See id. at 45-48. However, another commentator
and at least one court have indicated that the Department of Justice has a "track record for
mistreating qui tam relators and challenging their entitlement to share" in a successful outcome.
See Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 26, at 47.
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summary judgment for Hughes, finding that the "commonality
agreements" were authorized by all but one material party. 192 This
exception was held to be excusable because of a national security
interest in confidentiality. 193
On appeal, Schumer contested the summary judgment ruling on
the merits, while Hughes contended that the action should be
dismissed on one of two grounds: (1) that the alleged fraud occurred
prior to the 1986 amendments and that the amendments should not
apply retroactively, so the action should be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, or (2) that Schumer's complaint was "based upon public
disclosures of allegations," and' the, action should therefore be
jurisdictionally barred even if the 1986 amendments applied. 194 After
finding that the 1986 amendments to the FCA should apply
retroactively, the Ninth Circuit proceeded to Hughes' second
argument regarding ':public disclosure.' 95 Hughes alleged that
Schumer's allegations of fraud had been publicly disclosed through the
FOIA.196 More specifically, Hughes alleged that three unclassified
government audits by the Defense Contract Audit Agency were
available for public inspection upon a proper FOIA request. Therefore,
according to Hughes, the audits were publicly disclosed within the
meaning of the FCA's public disclosure bar.197 Hughes bolstered its
argument with a Third Circuit'opinion holding that allegations made
available via the discovery process were publicly disclosed. 198 The
Schumer court, however, relied on a D.C. Circuit opinion reaching the
opposite conclusion. 199 The D.C. Circuit held that only discovery
material "actually made public through filing" was disclosed; discovery
material merely exchanged between the parties, but not filed, "is only
theoretically available upon the public's request."200
The Schumer court considered this. reasoning to be
indispensable and rejected Hughes' argument that the FOIA rendered
the audits publicly disclosed.201 Relying on the dichotomy between
"actual" and "theoretical" availability as explained by the Court of
192. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d at 1516.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. See id..at 1517.
196. Id. at 1518.
197. Id. at 1519.
198. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1155-56
(3d Cir. 1991)).
199. Id. at 1519-20.





Appeals for the District of Columbia, the court noted that the audits in
question were only "theoretically" or "potentially" available through
the FOIA.2 °2 The court indicated that in order for information to be
deemed publicly disclosed within the meaning of the FCA, it must
actually be available-a higher standard than potential availability.
20 3
Unfortunately, though a writ of certiorari was ultimately granted by
the Supreme Court, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's ruling on
other grounds and thus failed to provide a definitive answer to the
question of whether a disclosure pursuant to FOIA constitutes a
public disclosure within the meaning of the FCA.204
C. Schumer's Logical Extension
More recently, in United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing
Authority of Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit considered whether a FOIA
request and subsequent disclosure constituted a public disclosure
within the meaning of the FCA. 20 5 In Mistick PBT, the court was faced
with a qui tam action under the FCA in which the relator requested
and obtained letters through the FOIA that had been written by a
business associate and addressed to the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development.20 6 The relator believed that these
letters contained evidence of false claims. 207 It was unclear whether
the letters, standing alone, contained sufficient information to
constitute either an "allegation" of a false claim or the "essential
elements" of a false claim.
208
The court in Mistick PBT, making a logical inference from
Schumer, held that the disclosure of information pursuant to a FOIA
request is "public disclosure" for purposes of the FCA.20 9 The court
noted the statutory language of the FOIA, that "[e]ach agency shall
make available to the public" certain specified information. 210 Next,
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See generally Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. 939 (vacating the decision of the Ninth
Circuit based on jurisdiction, because the fraudulent activity occurred prior to the 1986
amendments which were held not to apply retroactively). Under the pre-1986 FCA statute, a
different jurisdictional bar precluded a court from hearing FCA actions when the government
had knowledge of the relator's allegations prior to the commencement of the action. See supra
notes 41 & 43 and accompanying text.
205. 186 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1999).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 381.
208. See id. This issue was not necessary for deciding the case; it formed no part of the
appellate court's inquiry. See id.
209. Id. at 383.
210. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 522(a) (2000)) (emphasis added by the court).
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the court held that the public disclosure occurred within one of
contexts specified in § 3730(e)(4)(A). Recall from the previous
discussion that the public disclosure bar is only triggered if the
disclosure originates from one of the statutorily enumerated sources,
including an "administrative... report, hearing, audit or
investigation. '211 The court held that a FOIA disclosure constitutes an
"administrative... report" within the meaning of the FCA's public
disclosure bar.212 In doing so, the court relied on a dictionary definition
of "report"-"something that gives information" 213-and a Third
Circuit definition of "administrative"-"those administrative reports
that originate with the federal government."21 4
Another consideration apparently motivating the court's
decision was the fear that "public agency records would be flooded
with citizens requesting information in order to bring qui tam suits" if
FOIA disclosures were not jurisdictionally barred.215 The court noted
that "Congress did not intend the qui tam provision to transform
FOIA from sunshine legislation into a search for the pot of gold at the
end of the rainbow. '21 6
Moreover, the Mistick PBT court found solace in a Supreme
Court decision holding that "the disclosure of information pursuant to
the FOIA constitutes a 'public disclosure' within the meaning of the
Consumer Product Safety Act ("CPSA")." 217 In that case, the Court
was called upon to construe a provision of the CPSA that required
notice to be given to product manufacturers before the Consumer
Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") could publicly disclose any
information pertaining to a consumer product. 218 The purpose of the
CPSA is "to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury
associated with consumer products" and to assist consumers in
evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products[.]'' 219 The
211. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. Courts have generally held, as a plain
reading of the statutory language would suggest, that the statutorily enumerated sources of
disclosure are exclusive and not merely representative of potential disclosure sources. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. City of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 744-46 (3d Cir. 1997).
212. See United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 383
(3d Cir.1997).
213. See id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL-DICTIONARY 1925 (1971)).
214. See id. (quoting Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745).
215. Id. at 385.
216. Id.
217. See id at 383 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102 (1980)).
218. See GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. at 105.
219. 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b)(1), (2) (2000).
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CPSA created the CPSC to fulfill these statutory purposes.220 The
purpose of the notice provision, as construed by the Court, was to
ensure that the information disseminated by the CPSC was fair,
accurate, and in accordance with the central purpose of the CPSA.221
The provision therefore required notice to the relevant manufacturer
prior to any public disclosures which might directly or indirectly
reflect poorly on either the product or the product manufacturer. 222
The CPSA provides for additional protections which illustrate its
overriding purpose: Manufacturers must be given a chance to submit
comments regarding the information disclosed, and the CPSC must
retract the disclosure if the information released to the public is
inaccurate or misleading. 223
In light of the statutory history of the CPSA, it is troubling that
the Mistick PBT court found such comfort and persuasive value in this
opinion since the legislative and judicial context of the CPSA was
wholly unrelated to the issue before the court.224 For instance, while
the stated purpose of the CPSA stresses a need for broad disclosure,
the history surrounding the FCA posits no such need.225 Indeed, both
the legislative and judicial history of the FCA emphasize the need for
a broad remedial reading of the statute so that fraud will not go
unprosecuted.226 Instead, the Mistick PBT court, along with the
Schumer court in dicta, gave a broad interpretation to the
jurisdictional bar of the FCA.227 Incredibly, the courts have gone
against the goals of the Act by giving an overly broad reading to the
jurisdictional bar-the logical equivalent of giving the FCA itself a
very narrow reading. While the Supreme Court has stated that it "has
consistently refused to accept a rigid, restrictive reading [of the FCA],
even at the time when the statute imposed criminal sanctions," the
appellate courts have avoided this mandate. 228
Since the Third Circuit decided Mistick PBT, the Sixth,229
Seventh,230 and District of Columbia Circuits231 have joined in holding
220. See GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. at 104.
221. See id. at 105.
222. See § 2055(b)(1).
223. See id.
224. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
228. See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968).
229. See United States v. A.D. Roe Co., 186 F.3d 717, 723-24 (6th Cir. 1999).
230. See United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1017-18 (7th Cir.
1999).
1578 [Vol. 55:1549
2002] THE MARRIAGE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
that a public disclosure occurs within the meaning of the FCA when a
FOIA request results in disclosure of the information. Curiously
however, the most recent court of appeals to consider the issue
rejected this prevailing wisdom. 232 The Fourth Circuit stands alone in
holding that a disclosure pursuant to a FOIA request does not result
in a public disclosure within the meaning of the FCA.233 However, the
decision has two shortcomings. First, the court only considered the
issue in a footnote to the opinion, and, second, the decision is
unpublished. 2 4 Notwithstanding these shortfalls, the court's holding
is certainly plausible; FOIA disclosures do not fall within the public
disclosure bar because "FOIA information ... is not among the items
listed in § 3730(3)(4)(A) as 'public disclosures' and therefore does not
act as a jurisdictional bar. '235 The court then noted, as the vast
majority of the circuits have concluded, that the statutorily
enumerated list of disclosures is exclusive.
236
VII. THE FCA AND FOIA: OF PARASITIC POTENTIAL OR POSITIVE
SYNERGY?
Any reading of the FCA should arguably proceed with the twin
aims of the act in mind: "(1) to encourage private citizens with first-
hand knowledge to expose fraud; and (2) to avoid civil actions by
opportunists attempting to capitalize on public information without
seriously contributing to the disclosure of fraud."237 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has noted the remedial nature of the FCA: "In the
Various contexts in which questions of the proper construction of the
Act have been presented, the Court has consistently refused to accept
a rigid, restrictive reading, even at the time when the statute imposed
criminal sanctions as well- as civil."2 38 The Court has also indicated
231. See United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 684-86
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
232. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
233. Id.
234. See United States ex rel. Bondy v. Consumer Health Found., No. 00-2520, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24238, at *8 n.2, slip op. at 3. (4th Cir. Nov. 9, 2001). Note that according to the
Fourth Circuit local rule 36(c), the citation of unpublished opinions is disfavored.
235. Id. at *8 n.2.
236. Id.
237. See Lininger, supra note 53, at 590-91; United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century
Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1519-20 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing United States ex rel. Precision
Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 1992)).
238. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968).
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that since the purpose of the FCA is to recover stolen money for the
Treasury, the Act deserves a broad remedial interpretation. 2
39
Having knowledge of this historical context while interpreting
an ambiguous portion of the FCA should prove fruitful. The prevailing
view has either shunned this remedial logic or concluded that the
issue is unambiguous-thus providing evidence that the FCA has
fallen into disfavored status. For example, the Mistick PBT court
apparently had no reservations about ambiguities when it invoked the
jurisdictional bar based on a plain-meaning argument. 240 Nonetheless,
the future of FCA and FOIA synergy appears dim at this stage. It is
interesting to recall the impetus for encouraging qui tam actions
under the 1986 amendments-public outrage over massive fraud,
which culminated in congressional action.241  Whether FOIA
disclosures will bar future FCA actions depends both on public and
judicial sentiment toward the FCA and on whether the remaining
circuits find the prevailing wisdom persuasive. It is the purpose of this
Note to call for reform, and the remaining sections are devoted to this
task.
A. Where "Allegations or Transactions"Are Available via the FOIA
Where "allegations or transactions" are only possibly available
through the FOIA but not actually disclosed pursuant to a request,
this situation should not constitute public disclosure within the
meaning of the FCA's public disclosure bar. As Schumer noted, this
kind of information is not strictly or easily "accessible to the public."242
The fact that the information might later be released pursuant to a
proper request, and absent a relevant exemption, suggests a
relationship far too tenuous to be equated with public disclosure.
Furthermore, even after a thorough investigation, it may be virtually
impossible to predict whether requested information will be disclosed.
Correspondingly, Chief Judge Skelly Wright has noted that "the
federal bureaucracy has been extremely reluctant to embrace the
principle of public disclosure on which the FOIA is founded and, with
significant help from the federal courts interpreting the exemptions
broadly, not narrowly, has succeeded in frustrating much of its
implementation. ,"243 In some situations, FOIA availability is
239. See id. at 233.
240. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 47 & 64 and accompanying text.
242. See United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir
1995).
243. Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1200, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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subject to hostile opposition from both federal agencies and
corporations, who must now be notified in advance of disclosures. 244
In one case, large defense contractors fought a four-year court battle
against citizens demanding disclosure of defense contract spending.245
When disclosure was eventually compelled, the claimed "confidential
business data" revealed over two million dollars in suspicious lobbying
expenditures. 246 To suggest that information on which an FCA action
is brought is publicly disclosed because it is possibly available through
the FOIA is reminiscent of the former 1943 act under which
government possession of information barred the action 247-an evil
that Congress sought to cure with the 1986 amendments.
248
B. Where 'Allegations or Transactions" Are Disclosed Pursuant
to the FOIA
Although the courts of appeals have almost universally agreed
that a FOIA disclosure is sufficient to trigger the FCA's public
disclosure bar, this logic is incongruous with both the legislative and
judicial history of the Act and is utterly untenable if the FCA is to
remain a viable fraud-combating statute. First, it is clear that the
FCA's public disclosure bar is ambiguous. Indeed, "Virtually every
court of appeals that has considered the public disclosure bar
explicitly or implicitly agrees on one thing: the language of the statute
is not so plain as to clearly describe which cases Congress intended to
bar. '249 Second, due to the provision's ambiguity, legislative and
judicial history should be instructive as to the FCA's overriding
purpose. 250 Nevertheless, courts have rarely inquired into the purpose
of the Act when interpreting the ambiguous provision.251
Of course, if fraud is not prosecuted through the qui tam
provisions of the FCA, the Department of Justice may still bring an
244. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
245. HENDRICKS, supra note 6, at 49.
246. Id. The author notes that in "time[s] of severe budgetary restraints, taxpayers must
retain their ability to ensure that federal spending is both wise and efficient. The Freedom of
Information Act makes such oversight possible." Id. Although such oversight is possible,
however, the FOIA is of only limited value if there is no recourse to ensure that fraud is
prosecuted. Id.
247. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
249. United States ex. rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 681 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
250. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
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action against the perpetrator. 252 One therefore may be inclined to
accept a restrictive reading of the FCA if fraud will otherwise be
prosecuted. However, all the evidence supports the notion that most
fraud will go undetected and unprosecuted if the qui tam provisions do
not secure a prominent place in fraud prosecution. 253 According to the
General Accounting Office, most fraud will go undeterred absent qui
tam enforcement: "For those who are caught committing fraud, the
chances of being prosecuted.., are slim.... The sad truth is that
crime against the government does pay."254 It could therefore be
argued that the public disclosure bar should be interpreted to ensure
that fraud against the government is prosecuted and thereby deterred.
At the very least, any interpretation of the public disclosure
bar should not render the qui tam FCA action impotent or severely
impaired. Unfortunately, the prevailing view does render the qui tam
FCA enforcement action severely impaired, if not totally impotent.
Hypothetical analysis of FCA and FOIA jurisprudence under the
prevailing precedent will illustrate this point.
First, consider the case of hypothetical Relator 1. Relator 1 has
"direct and independent knowledge" of a particular instance of fraud
on the government (e.g., he is an employee for a government
contractor). 255 Relator 1 will qualify as an "original source" if and only
if he "voluntarily provides the information" to the government prior to
filing his suit. 256. In addition, though few circuits have considered this
issue, the D.C. and Sixth Circuits agree that a relator must
voluntarily provide the information to the government prior to any
public disclosure in order to qualify as an original source.25 7 So,
Relator 1, as an insider with full knowledge of the fraud, brings a qui
tam FCA action against the perpetrator. Unbeknownst to Relator 1,
FOIA requester W has requested government audits on Relator l's
252. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. See also Joan Biskupic, Justices Ask: Can
Citizens Sue for U.S.? Law Aimed at Fraud Issue in Vermont, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1999, at A04
(discussing the FCA action and its net three billion-dollar recovery for the United States
Treasury); Micheal Isikoff, Defense Lobbyists Bottle up Bill on Contractor Fraud, WASH. POST,
Aug. 17, 1986, at K01 (discussing the inadequate resources of the Justice Department to
investigate even known fraud and stating that "as a result, some fraudulent defense contractors
have a virtually free ride").
254. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269 (quoting GAO, Fraud
in Government Programs: How Extensive is It? How Can it be Controlled?, GAO REP. at 19
(1981)).
255. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
256. See id.
257. See United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 943 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1077 (1998); United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron
Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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employer. The disclosed audits reveal both the allegation of fraud and
all its essential elements. Hence, under the prevailing precedent, the
"allegations or transactions" of fraud which Relator l's complaint is
"based upon" have been publicly disclosed, and the action will be
jurisdictionally barred.258
Luckily, however, Relator 1 considers the action to be
maintainable, even under a Mistick PBT analysis, because he
calculates that the court will never learn of the disclosure to W.
Unfortunately for Relator 1, however, his employer will most certainly
know of the disclosure to W by virtue of a 1987 executive order
requiring disclosure to corporations when business records are being
released under the FOIA.259 Therefore, the corporation will simply
raise the jurisdictional public disclosure bar as a defense to Relator l's
action and will likely escape prosecution altogether for the reasons
mentioned above. 260
It will be impossible for Relator 1 to protect himself by
becoming an original source, because the disclosure to W may have
occurred prior to Relator 1. learning of the fraud or having the
opportunity to disclose it to the government.261 Alternatively, assume
Relator 1 still has complete knowledge of the fraud and seeks to bring
a qui tam action but that this time requester W has requested
information containing only the essential elements of the fraud. In
other words, the information W obtains through the FOIA does not
contain an allegation of fraud itself but only constitutes an allegation
of fraud when the elements are put together by an inference (e.g., by
doing a mathematical calculation). In this case, W may have no idea
that fraud has occurred. Similarly, even the governmental agency
itself may be totally unaware that a fraud has been committed. Here
again, however, Relator l's FCA action will be jurisdictionally barred
due to the public disclosure. More precisely, Relator l's action is
"based upon" (i.e., supported by) the "public disclosure" (i.e., via the
FOIA to W) of "allegations or transactions" (i.e., the essential elements
of fraud).262 Therefore, the fraud of which Relator 1 has intimate
knowledge remains unprosecuted because W requested audits which
happened to contain the essential elements of the fraudulent
transaction. In this regard, it is important to note that there are
countless reasons for requesting information through the FOIA, and
258. See § 3730(e)(4)(A); see also supra note 148 (explaining that most courts have concluded
that "based upon" means "supported by").
259. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
260. See supra Part IV.
261. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
262. See § 3730(e)(4)(A).
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the possibility that some requesters will remain oblivious to fraud
even when they have the essential elements in a document remains
great. 26
3
Now consider the case of hypothetical Relator 2. Relator 2 is a
low-ranking employee of a large defense contracting firm and is
responsible for overseeing certain aspects of performance under a
government contract. A requisite to complete performance under the
contract is compliance with all applicable environmental laws.
264
Specifically, the contract requires that the firm attest to compliance
with these laws in order to receive payment under the contract. After
Relator 2's firm completes performance and receives payment, Relator
2, from his own investigation, becomes suspicious that some
environmental laws were violated. However, Relator 2 does not
possess any of the information from which fraud can be inferred. He
has only the bare allegation of fraud to make his stand. 265 Of course
Relator 2 will be wary of disclosing his bare allegation for fear that he
is mistaken or because he has nothing to gain and much to lose. The
FCA provides Relator 2 with an economic incentive to disclose the
fraud, but in this case a disclosure will jurisdictionally bar the action.
In other words, Relator 2 cannot qualify as an original source, because
he does not have "direct and independent knowledge of the
information on which the allegations are based."
266
Should Relator 2 have any recourse to expose this potential
fraud? First, Relator 2 may notify the Department of Justice of his
allegation, but such notification is unlikely to lead to a successful
prosecution due to the reasons previously noted. 267 Second, Relator 2
may commence his own investigation through FOIA disclosure
requests. If Relator 2 obtains the necessary information to establish
fraud through the FOIA, he may be persuaded to bring a formal FCA
action both to recover damages for the Treasury and to punish his
company for defrauding the government and polluting the
environment. Of course, Relator 2 will be surprised to learn that he
will be jurisdictionally barred from bringing his action in at least four
263. See generally FOERSTEL, supra note 173, at 212 (discussing the mutifaceted nature of
the FOIA and why persons request information under the FOIA).
264. Such a term is common in government contracts, especially those involving
environmental issues. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 53, at 587-88.
265. For example, Relator 2 overhears a manager alluding to noncompliance.
266. See § 3730(e)(4)(B).
267. See supra notes 73-76; Micheal Isikoff, Defense Lobbyists Bottle up Bill on Contractor
Fraud, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1986, at K01 (stating that "thousands of cases of potential fraud
fall through the cracks each year because they involve misbillings that aren't large enough to
persuade the Justice Department to devote the necessary time and expense to bring criminal or
civil actions").
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circuits; the fraud is therefore likely to go undeterred, and the
Treasury will suffer a net loss.
268
Next, consider the case of hypothetical Relator 3. Relator 3 is a
subcontractor working on military aircraft pursuant to a government
contract that includes strict specifications. 269 In the course of his work,
Relator 3 becomes dissatisfied with his central contractor C. Relator 3
uncovers information leading him to believe that C is taking
advantage of him by not fulfilling all of his contractual obligations.
Eventually, Relator 3 and C become involved in litigation over a
breach of contract. Relator 3, pursuant to his litigation investigation,
obtains government audits through the FOIA which contain false
information submitted by C. The only reason Relator 3 knows the
information submitted is false is because he performed the work to
specification Y where C attested that the work was performed to
specification X. That is, X represents the disclosure of the false state of
affairs through the FOIA, and Y represents the true state of affairs
originally known only to Relator 3. Here the allegation of fraud could
not have been inferred though the FOIA disclosure alone, because only
Relator 3 would have the requisite knowledge to infer fraud from X
and Y. If however, Relator 3 files a FCA action under the qui tam
provision, he will be jurisdictionally barred, because his complaint will
be "based upon" (i.e., supported by) the "public disclosure" (i.e., via the
FOIA disclosure) of "allegations or transactions" (i.e., X and y).27o
It should be apparent that none of these outcomes is desirable.
In addition, these hypothetical cases may seem even more
objectionable when a further element is added. Consider again the
case of Relator 2, armed with the bare allegation of fraud with no
supporting facts. Relator 2 pursues his own investigation of the fraud
and eventually uncovers the documents supporting the fratid (i.e.,
containing all its essential elements) in a company warehouse. He will
be surprised to learn that his FCA action is jurisdictionally barred
because the allegations on which his complaint is based were
previously publicly disclosed. But how could this scenario evolve if
Relator 2 was so careful to obtain his information from inside the
company? As it turns out, Relator 2's company routinely requests
FOIA audits on virtually all company business; hence, Relator 2's FCA
action will be foreclosed based on the fraud perpetrator's FOIA
268. See supra notes 229-31.
269. For purposes of simplicity, assume that the subcontractor is one individual.
270. See § 3730(e)(4)(B). Note that under current law, Y will be held to have been publicly
disclosed-not through the FOIA, but from discovery materials regarding the lawsuit between
Relator 3 and C. See United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d
376, 385 (3d Cir. 1999).
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request. For obvious reasons, such a request and subsequent
disclosure will have no effect on the fraud actually being prosecuted.
Therefore, though the government is no closer to being made whole
and the perpetrator is no closer to being deterred, the qui tam
enforcement action will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, if
this perverted conception of FCA jurisprudence is to continue,
corporate fraud perpetrators would be well-advised to seek FOIA
disclosure of all fraudulent activity in order to insulate themselves
from FCA liability.
C. An Interpretational Solution to the Public Disclosure Dilemma
As a starting point, any tenable interpretation of the FCA
should give effect to its legislative mandate, which is to encourage the
private prosecution of fraud while discouraging parasitic actions that
merely take advantage of information already in the public domain. 271
In other words, private citizens should be encouraged to bring FCA
actions based on their own knowledge, but freeloaders who contribute
nothing to the action should be statutorily barred.272  Any
interpretation of the public disclosure bar should not depart from the
statutory language when it is clear. 273 Furthermore, any viable
interpretation should not lend itself to a reductio ad absurdum
argument as the hypotheticals above do.274
Perhaps the most readily accessible interpretation of the FCA's
public disclosure bar is that information disclosed pursuant to the
FOIA does not fall within the meaning of "public disclosure."
Therefore, hypothetical Relators 1, 2, and 3 would not be
jurisdictionally barred, but will be free to pursue FCA actions on the
government's behalf. Alternatively, courts might hold that a disclosure
pursuant to a FOIA request is a "public disclosure" within the
meaning of the FCA, but that an action based on such disclosure is not
jurisdictionally barred because the disclosure did not fall under one of
the statutorily exclusive sources in § 3730(e)(4)(A). 275 In this case, one
might conclude that a FOIA disclosure does not rise to the level of an
"administrative... report" in the context of the FCA. 276 Either of
271. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
273. "[lIt is preferable for the law to rule rather than any one of its citizens, and according to
this same principle, even if it be better for certain men to govern, they must be appointed as
guardians of the laws and in subordination to them .. " ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1287a (H.
Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1990) (1944).
274. See discussion supra Part VI.B.
275. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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these interpretations is subject to attack, however, based on the
argument that each of them would let parasitic actions flourish. Of
course, the strength of this challenge necessarily depends on one's
notion of a parasitic claim. Though reasonable minds may disagree on
the definition of parasitic, the general idea is that actions revealing no
new information should be barred as parasitic or opportunistic. 277
From a public policy standpoint, one may argue that either
interpretation would open the qui tam door to a flood of parasitic
claims. 278 The argument, as articulated by the Third Circuit, is as
follows: If FCA actions were allowed to be based upon FOIA
disclosures, public agency records would be flooded with FOIA
requests from private citizens seeking information with which to bring
FCA actions. 279 This slippery-slope argument, at least according to the
Third Circuit, represents a public peril to be avoided at all costs.
280 Of
course, one cannot help but speculate as to the degree this logic, or
illogic, has motivated courts in deciding these issues. To the extent
that one finds this reasoning persuasive, at least two questions must
be answered: (1) Is there any good reason to think that FOIA requests
will overwhelm federal agencies, and, (2) if agencies are overwhelmed,
is this necessarily an evil which needs to be prevented?
First, the Third Circuit's argument disregards the effect that
the costly nature of a qui tam suit has on the litigation process. Qui
tam litigation can be prohibitively expensive from the relator's
standpoint,281 and if the Department of Justice declines to intervene in
prosecuting the case, the expense problem is compounded. 28 2 Though
the Department of Justice can easily outspend any large defense
contractor, most law firms cannot.28 3 It is therefore likely that qui tam
actions that are not meritorious would be weeded out far in advance of
trial, especially if the Justice Department is not intervening in th6
case.
284
Next, the argument against parasitic claims misunderstands
the complex process behind FOIA disclosures. First, disclosure
requests under the FOIA must be for specific "records," not
"information." Agencies are "not required to research or analyze data
277. See Beck, supra note 11, at 558.
278. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
279. See Mistick PBT, 186 F.3d at 385.
280. See id.
281. See DeWitt, supra note 27, at 45.
282. See id.
283. See id.




for a requester."28 5 Rather, they are "only required to look for an
existing document as described in a FOIA request."28 6 In addition, only
a written request conforming to several other formalities "place[s] the
agency under a legal obligation to respond."28 7 Moreover, any
requester is subject to certain fees and costs of processing which vary
with the purpose of the request or the status of the requester. 288
Therefore, not only are the litigation costs of bringing a qui tam action
prohibitively expensive, but the costs associated with a FOIA request
can also be substantial.28 9 Because of these factors, the Third Circuit's
argument that agencies will be flooded with FOIA requests from
hopeful get-rich-quick relators is mistaken. A potential relator having
no knowledge of fraudulent activity will have a very difficult task of
uncovering fraud through the FOIA in the first place-not to mention
risking the danger of incurring monetary costs.
Not only is the Third Circuit's scenario unlikely to occur, but it
is wholly unclear that if it did occur it would be undesirable since it is
unclear that a FOIA requester who obtains knowledge of fraud is unfit
to serve as a proper qui tam relator. Even if one seeks to prohibit
parasitic claims, this claim is not parasitic because parasitic claims
are those that merely take advantage of information already in the
public domain.290 If a relator's claim, wholly based on a FOIA
disclosure, is allowed to go forward it is unclear that this qualifies as
parasitic. This claim would only take advantage of information
already in the public domain, assuming FOIA disclosures are in the
public domain. The fact that only one or two individuals will be privy
to some FOIA disclosures demonstrates that the information is not in
the public domain, at least not in the traditional sense. Moreover, the
purpose of the FCA is to prevent and prosecute fraud. If the fraud
uncovered through the FOIA is not meritorious it will be abandoned
for the reasons already stated.291
VIII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have
rendered an untenable reading of the public disclosure bar as it





289. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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bringing otherwise meritorious FCA suits, the courts' prevailing
wisdom is unjustifiable. Not only do Relators 1, 2, and 3 have
meritorious suits, but also, in each case barring their actions
inevitably leads to injustice. The Treasury will not recover stolen
money, and the perpetrator of the fraud will go unpunished if these
actions are barred. It is equally unlikely that the Justice Department
will ever uncover the fraud, and even if it does, it is unlikely that the
fraud will ever be prosecuted. 292 If the FCA is to remain a viable
fraud-prosecuting statute, other courts of appeals must take notice of
the irrational implications of current interpretation. The
representative cases of Relators 1, 2, and 3 serve both to illustrate the
ineptitude of the prevailing precedent and also to demonstrate a
viable synergy between the FCA and FOIA.
Although it is unclear precisely what factors have motivated
these four courts to reach such an untenable interpretation of the
FCA, it is clear that these holdings have not given effect to the policies
behind the FCA's rich statutory history.293 Moreover, these decisions
so weaken the utility of the FCA that fraud perpetrators may
effectively absolve themselves of liability by using the public
disclosure bar as a defense. Indeed, corporations can literally profit
from the public disclosure bar by "publicly disclosing" information
through the FOIA that contains fraudulent allegations or
transactions, thereby shielding themselves from later prosecution.
The interpretation of the public disclosure bar which conforms
most clearly to the statutory language, legislative history, and public
policy is that FOIA disclosures do not amount to "public disclosures"
within the meaning of the FCA. To hold otherwise would be to
interpret the public disclosure bar broadly (i.e., to interpret the FCA
narrowly). This interpretation is not plausible, because it necessarily
rejects the sweeping mandate of the 1986 amendments, which sought
to encourage qui tam litigation to preserve the public fisc. 294 Instead,
qui tam litigation has been discouraged by these decisions and has
effectively been made anachronistic. As the Supreme Court has noted,
"[T]he objective of Congress in enacting the False Claims Act was to
broadly protect the funds and property of the Government from
fraudulent claims, regardless of the particular form, or function, of the
government instrumentality upon which such claims were
292. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
293. See supra discussion Parts II, III.
294. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
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made.. ."295 In the current disfavored environment of FCA litigation,
it is crucial that the judiciary take Congress's mandate more seriously.
James Roy Moncus IHr
295. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968) (citing Rainwater v. United
States, 356 U.S. 590 (1958)).
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